Misva #46: A Husband’s Obligations to His Wife

In discussing the laws relevant to an Ama Ibri’a (Jewish maidservant), the Torah (Shemot 21:10) commands that if the master marries the maidservant, then “She’ereah Kesutah Ve’onatah Lo Yigra” – he must not deprive her of food, clothing or intimacy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah here establishes an obligation binding upon every man who marries a woman, to provide her with food, clothing and intimacy. Although the Torah speaks here specifically of the case of a master who marries his maidservant, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this obligation in fact pertains to all marriages. If a master who marries his maidservant bears an obligation to care for her, then certainly, in a regular marriage, the husband is duty-bound to care for his wife’s needs. This command is applicable at all times and in all locations. A husband who knowingly deprives his wife of one of these three privileges despite being able to provide it transgresses this Biblical prohibition. He does not, however, receive Malkut, because Malkut are administered only for an active violation of a Torah prohibition, and this prohibition is violated through inaction, by failing to fulfill one’s obligations. The Gemara brings a debate between Rav and Shemuel as to how Bet Din should act when a wife claims that her husband fails to provide her with food or clothing. Shemuel maintains that “Kofin Oto Le’farnes” – the Bet Din coerces the husband to provide her what she is owed. Rav, however, maintains “Kofin Oto Le’garesh” – Bet Din forces the husband to divorce his wife. The rationale underlying Rav’s position is “En Adam Dar Im Nahash Bi’kfifa Ahat” – a person cannot be expected to live together with a “snake” in its den. If the husband is so neglectful that he refused to give his wife her basic needs, then the wife should not be expected to continue living with him, and therefore, if she so wishes, Bet Din forces the husband to grant her a divorce. The Aharonim (later scholars) debate the question of what happens if the husband is simply unable to provide his wife with food or clothing, such as if he lost his job and has no money, and the wife wants a divorce. According to some opinions, even Rav would agree that the husband is not compelled to divorce, because Rav advanced this view only if the husband was stingy and neglectful, refusing to provide for his wife even though he had the ability to do so. Others, however, maintain that to the contrary, in this case, even Shemuel would agree that the husband is forced to grant a divorce, because he does not have the ability to support her. As for the obligation of Ona (intimacy), a husband who denies his wife her conjugal rights is forced to divorce her. The Gemara explains that the Ona obligation depends on the husband’s profession, as some professions require the husband to spend more time away from home, in which case he is expected to fulfill this obligation less frequently. The Tanna’im debate the question of whether a man can marry a woman on the condition that he will be absolved of these obligations, if the wife accepts the condition. Rabbi Meir maintains that such a betrothal does not take effect, because the man is “Matneh Al Ma She’katub Ba’Torah” – making a condition suspending the obligations imposed by the Torah. Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that with regard to the obligations of food and clothing, such a condition can be made. In his view, when it comes to monetary obligations, one is able to make conditions contrary to Torah law if the other party consents. Therefore, if the woman agrees to marry the man on the condition that he will not be responsible to provide her with food with clothing, then the betrothal takes effect. However, if a husband betroths on condition that he is absolved of his obligation to provide conjugal rights, then Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the betrothal does not take effect, as this is not a monetary obligation, and therefore such a condition cannot be made, even if the wife consents. According to all opinions, the wife can waive her rights once the couple is married. If, for example, a woman decides to work and support herself, she can forego on her husband’s responsibility to support her, and the husband then bears no obligation to do so. It should be clarified that these obligations are independent of the obligations to which a husband commits in the Ketuba document which he signs at the time of the wedding. A husband’s responsibility to support his wife constitutes a Torah obligation, whereas the Ketuba is required by force of Rabbinic enactment. In this contract, the husband commits to pay his wife a certain sum if the marriage is dissolved. But his obligation to care for her needs during marriage applies on the level of Torah law. We learn from this Misva the fundamental principle that charity begins at home. While all charity certainly constitutes a Misva, the most important and fundamental obligation of charity is the obligation owed to one’s wife, to care for all her needs. Before one generously gives to charitable causes, he must first ensure that he fulfills his basic obligations at home.