Lebanese Truisms

The land known as Mount Lebanon and which constituted under the Maan and Chehab dynasties the political entity governed by a local ‘Prince’ after securing the sine qua non approval of the Ottoman suzerain, had few truisms inherent to it and embedded in its collective consciousness.  The truisms comprised the selection of a somewhat just ‘Prince’ assisted by a group of mostly loyal, but often perfidious notables. Within such mountainous elite the degrees of perfidy and corruption varied from one century to another and sometimes within the same decades.

The ‘Prince’ was generally viewed as a ruler with no official religion, and an arbiter of causes who is presumed to have an acute sense of equity and justice. He stood above all the rest since by birth he belonged to a princely line, and not to any particular feudal family, or a region or just a community. This placed him in a unique position of impartiality. The Maan’s were Druzes whereas the Chehabs were Sunnis and later converts to Christianity. The first were from the Chouf and the second from Wadi Al Taym. Little did these local differences matter. The justice and equity of Fakhr El Din II were exemplary. That of Bachir II less so, but it was well known that under his rule a mule carrying a stack of gold could travel throughout the mountain with no fears of being stolen. Fakhr El Din II belonged to the political faction known as Qaisi, not a religious party. His opponents the princely Alameddines  were the standard-bearers of the Yemini party, another non-religious affiliation. As far as religion was concerned it was noted that Fakhr El Din II, whilst a proud Druze, gifted Druze lands to the Maronite Church from as far as Nahr El Kalb to Jezzine. Prince Bachir II was born Sunni, lived like a Druze and died a Maronite, buried at the Armenian cemetery in Istanbul. Lineage, social status, and political partisanship were far more important affiliations than sectarianism.

On the far end, the composition of the country’s notable class was premised on  loyalty and bravery in battles, not on religious grounds. Notables were from all confessions and regions of Mount Lebanon and beyond. Druze, Sunnis, Shia, Maronites and Orthodox clansmen bound together, from the cliffs of the Kesrouan to the ridges of the Chouf to the high Metn and Bekaa Valley. The notables were chosen to assist the 'Prince' in ruling the country based on their closeness to said ‘Prince’: by allegiance to either the Qaisi or Yemini parties. Not by faith or remittances. No religion was favored and no gold in the world could buy a notable such a title, or a place at the Prince’s table. Gold was always useful -but not indispensable- for winning the favors of the ruler but not to acquire feudal status. In essence gold was best left to souk merchants, to rapacious Ottoman Pashas, and to insatiable tax collectors. The notables of Mount Lebanon, in reality a grouping of tax farmers whose role was to collect the yearly tribute and  raise a small army in times of war, had gained their status due, in part, to merit. Valor on the field (at the battles of Marj Dabik or Ain Dara) or loyalty to the princely household (Maan or Chehab), or both. This did not absolve this class from the sins of corruption and exploitation. Corruption was manifest, and exploitation was rampant in the treatment of peasants. These wretched souls toiled the land, worked menial jobs, paid their individual tax (the Miri), and answered the call of war without hesitation or much choice.

For the peasantry which constituted the majority of the populace, the government or rather the ultimate source of power was situated far away in Istanbul. The sole representative of said power was ‘the Prince’. He was the only manifestation of such authority on earth. The ‘Prince’ was in essence the government and vice versa. The notables were intermediaries between the former and the people. The masses rarely met the government, a.k.a. the ‘Prince’,

The land known as Mount Lebanon and which constituted under the Maan and Chehab dynasties the political entity governed by a local ‘Prince’ after securing the sine qua non approval of the Ottoman suzerain, had few truisms inherent to it and embedded in its collective consciousness.  The truisms comprised the selection of a somewhat just ‘Prince’ assisted by a group of mostly loyal, but often perfidious notables. Within such mountainous elite the degrees of perfidy and corruption varied from one century to another and sometimes within the same decades.

The ‘Prince’ was generally viewed as a ruler with no official religion, and an arbiter of causes who is presumed to have an acute sense of equity and justice. He stood above all the rest since by birth he belonged to a princely line, and not to any particular feudal family, or a region or just a community. This placed him in a unique position of impartiality. The Maan’s were Druzes whereas the Chehabs were Sunnis and later converts to Christianity. The first were from the Chouf and the second from Wadi Al Taym. Little did these local differences matter. The justice and equity of Fakhr El Din II were exemplary. That of Bachir II less so, but it was well known that under his rule a mule carrying a stack of gold could travel throughout the mountain with no fears of being stolen. Fakhr El Din II belonged to the political faction known as Qaisi, not a religious party. His opponents the princely Alameddines  were the standard-bearers of the Yemini party, another non-religious affiliation. As far as religion was concerned it was noted that Fakhr El Din II, whilst a proud Druze, gifted Druze lands to the Maronite Church from as far as Nahr El Kalb to Jezzine. Prince Bachir II was born Sunni, lived like a Druze and died a Maronite, buried at the Armenian cemetery in Istanbul. Lineage, social status, and political partisanship were far more important affiliations than sectarianism.

On the far end, the composition of the country’s notable class was premised on  loyalty and bravery in battles, not on religious grounds. Notables were from all confessions and regions of Mount Lebanon and beyond. Druze, Sunnis, Shia, Maronites and Orthodox clansmen bound together, from the cliffs of the Kesrouan to the ridges of the Chouf to the high Metn and Bekaa Valley. The notables were chosen to assist the ‘Prince’ in ruling the country based on their closeness to said ‘Prince’: by allegiance to either the Qaisi or Yemini parties. Not by faith or remittances. No religion was favored and no gold in the world could buy a notable such a title, or a place at the Prince’s table. Gold was always useful -but not indispensable- for winning the favors of the ruler but not to acquire feudal status. In essence gold was best left to souk merchants, to rapacious Ottoman Pashas, and to insatiable tax collectors. The notables of Mount Lebanon, in reality a grouping of tax farmers whose role was to collect the yearly tribute and  raise a small army in times of war, had gained their status due, in part, to merit. Valor on the field (at the battles of Marj Dabik or Ain Dara) or loyalty to the princely household (Maan or Chehab), or both. This did not absolve this class from the sins of corruption and exploitation. Corruption was manifest, and exploitation was rampant in the treatment of peasants. These wretched souls toiled the land, worked menial jobs, paid their individual tax (the Miri), and answered the call of war without hesitation or much choice.

For the peasantry which constituted the majority of the populace, the government or rather the ultimate source of power was situated far away in Istanbul. The sole representative of said power was ‘the Prince’. He was the only manifestation of such authority on earth. The ‘Prince’ was in essence the government and vice versa. The notables were intermediaries between the former and the people. The masses rarely met the government, a.k.a. the ‘Prince’, and never questioned the role of the notables in channeling their demands, unaltered, to the  ‘Prince’s ear.

Over the centuries , few notable (some prefer feudal) families survived but the majority of the new governing bourgeoisie of the 19th century evolved from a class of college graduates (primarily lawyers) and wealthy merchants whose proximity to the Ottoman Empire and later, to the French Mandatory power was based on linguistic, cultural and, for the first time, on religious affinities. Civil unrest rooted in socioeconomic causes in middle 19th century Mount Lebanon was turned into religious conflict, in the process inaugurating a new sectarian era. The Capitulations that were imposed by the ascending European Kingdoms onto the declining Ottoman Empire in the 1800s, transformed -for the first time in history- some of the minority groups in Syria and Lebanon into local protégés of foreign powers. Protection was based purely on religious grounds (without any other merit). Each foreign nation, from France and Great Britain to Russia and Austria had its own enclave of supporters and beneficiaries. Any aspiring notable would have to necessarily be the porte parole of his own religious community without necessarily any political aspirations or views about the country as a whole. So, valor in battle and loyalty to the ‘Prince’ that prevailed in the past centuries were now transposed into religious identity and loyalty to the foreign power.

With the advent of independence of Lebanon in 1943, came a disturbing situation. The new Republic (modeled after the French constitution) had no ‘Prince, but the notable class found a place in the new regime. In a stroke of  genius, the new elite substituted the notion of ‘Prince’ to that of the ‘Republic’ represented by the President, assisted by a large court of notables (new & old) called the Council of Ministers. In a way, the Lebanese political axioms caught up with modernity and became constitutional realities.

Sadly, the new ‘Prince’ or the actual President when administering the affairs of the State, did not always act with impartiality as far as the interests of his clan, or party or coreligionists were concerned. As such he was no more viewed by the ‘notables’ as the ultimate source of sovereign power, or the arbiter of last resort between all factions. Challenges to the ‘Prince’ or President started in earnest and for various reasons under the presidency of B. El Khoury, and of C. Chamoun. Tensions were renewed between the notables and the ‘Prince’ under the tenure of C. Helou and S. Franjieh, culminating in a terrible civil war from 1975 to 1990.

Post-Taef Agreement, in the early 1900s the ‘Prince’ or the President’s wings were clipped, and by extension those of his community which heeded its fate and, licked its wounds awaiting better times. The remaining ‘notables’ now regrouped in the Council of Ministers tried to divide the spoils of the country using their well-honed skills and inherently cupid nature towards power and money. At such junction, PM Hariri tried to fill-in the role of the ‘Prince’ but was only tolerated as a super Vizir, never a ‘Prince’ of Lebanon. The absence of an effective ‘Prince’ or President caused a serious anomaly in the distribution of both power and bounty. Henceforth, an invisible ‘Prince’ was created -with no specific religious beliefs to favor and; no particular community to champion – in the form of the Syrian occupation force. Such force was represented by an officer, a ‘Dark Prince’ so to speak, who was highly skilled in the arts of corruption, coercion, torture and other barbarian qualities. A much-needed equilibrium was thus reintroduced into the system from 1995 till the exit of the Syrian forces in 2005.

At present, whilst Hezbollah is the strongest party in Lebanon, it cannot play the role of the ‘Prince’. It is incapable of dissociating its image, interests and grand designs from those of its own Shia community or its regional patron Iran. Consequently, it cannot be considered as the super-ruler of all of Lebanon. The ‘Wannabe Prince’ namely, Pres. Aoun is viewed, along with his close family and entourage, as a parvenu notable with nominal powers. The ‘Illegitimate Prince’, Samir Geagea has committed a fatal political about face, which caused him a loss of credibility with allies and earned him no support from rivals.  The ‘Little Prince’ a.k.a. PM Saad Al Hariri is no more one, having lost his dual source of power to wit, access to the Saudis and to a limitless bank account. At best, he has sustained his position as the strongest (but not only) contender within the Sunni circle of notables. Walid Jumblatt, the ‘Historic Prince’ does not even seek such role anymore and is trying  to maintain his position as a ‘notable’, with one seat at the power table, and few crumbs left to pick from.

So, the ‘notables’ (old & new) have somewhat survived and reinvented their class whilst not shedding their corrupt nature, quite to the contrary. They have perfected their nefarious trade at the tunes of modernity and are now dabbling into financial engineering schemes, gas revenues, waste collection, and soon into the cannabis-growing industry. But the country remains without a ‘Prince’ and without guidance or comfort.

Back into history, the absence of a ‘Prince’ at the time of the death of Fakhr El Din’s II in 1635 brought ravaging wars by the Ottoman troops and much confusion and internal strife. The ousting of Bashir II in 1840 brought 20 years of civil dissent which culminated in the massacres of 1860.

No ‘Prince’ is coming back, that is a given. The notion of the ‘Prince’ in Lebanon should be substituted by that of the State. One way of rallying around the idea of a State, and rebuilding its edifices and pillars, is to think of it as the impartial, non-religious, all -equitable, arbiter of last resort, similar to what the people thought of the physical ‘Prince’ centuries ago. Such ‘Prince’/State will have no family ties, no religion and no region. An effective State could ultimately reduce the notables to irrelevance or better, condemn them to extinction by dis-intermediating between State and people.

This assertion of the State’s powers could come from a public revolt which is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Or it could emanate from a military coup d’Etat which is not advisable at any time. Finally it could come from an Act of God, which is much anticipated but far-fetched. Since, a ‘Prince’/State is not emerging soon, why then the need for the notables’ (or feudal) class? Why the need to have them govern the ungovernable, or marshal the depleted coffers of the Treasury, or mismanage an already dysfunctional administration?

So, if the Lebanese Truisms are: an impartial ‘Prince’ and; a less-than-perfect group of notables, why lose the first without the other? Rebuilding from the ashes would be simpler, and much cleaner.