How Bayesianism Adresses the Problem(s) of Induction

Chloé de Canson (University of Cambridge) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (2-4 June, 2016) titled "How Bayesianism Addresses the Problem(s) of Induction". Abstract: The paper seeks to argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the right kind of theory to account for confirmation. More precisely, a thorough (non-Bayesian) analysis of the paradox of the raven is used to show that (i) propositions play the role of evidence; (ii) there are two relations involved in confirmation, a logical one whose relata are propositions, and an epistemic one whose antecedent is a learning event; (iii) background knowledge is highly relevant; (iv) the logical relation is non-monotonic. The paper then shows that, unlike the hypothetico-deductive method and broadly Carnapian approaches, Bayesian Confirmation Theory satisfies all these criteria, and concludes that it is the right sort of theory to account for confirmation.