Discharge of Accused and Power of Revision in Criminal Cases

Facts in Brief

In the instant case, the accused had moved an Application seeking discharge under Section 239 of CrPC contending that he has been falsely implicated. However, his application was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that the merits of the case can be gone into only at the later stages of trial. The accused moved the High Court under its revisionary jurisdiction of Section 397 of CrPC but the High Court also declined to entertain the Revision Petition observing that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction and the present case is not the one.

Important Provisions

Section 239. When accused shall be discharged.— If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. 

Section 397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision — (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. 

(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. 

Precedents Discussed by the Court 

The Court discussed the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299, that was relied upon by the High Court to dismiss the Revision Petition of the accused. The High Court had relied upon the following excerpt: -

“37. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to reappreciate the matter…..”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reconciled the interpretations provided in Asian Resurfacing (supra) and the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, and observed that the “orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC.”

Further, it was observed that the High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 and other provisions of CrPC to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice. According to the Court, though such discretion is to be exercised carefully yet it does not mean that a hyper technical approach is to be adopted. 

Held by the Court

The Court concluded by stating that: - 

“17. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.”

Therefore, it was held by the Court that the High Court had committed jurisdictional error in the present case by not entertaining the Revision Petition of the accused and “overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused.” Hence, the case was remanded back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law. 

Concluding Remarks

Since my college days, I had been reading and hearing about the Madhu Limaye (supra) case from my professors and friends. Even when I joined litigation, this case continued to influence the revision petitions in which I was involved. Madhu Limaye (supra) is a 1977 Judgment and more than 4 decades have passed since then yet the same question relating to the distinction between interlocutory order and final order in relation to Section 397 of CrPC keeps coming up and time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has to again reiterate that Madhu Limaye (supra) is still a good law.

I think there is a tendency to adopt hyper-technical approach by many judges and advocates. No doubt that Section 397 talks about revisionary powers of the High Court and no doubt that S. 397 (2) seeks to bar its applicability against interlocutory orders, but the fact of the matter is that there are other provisions as well in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. One cannot simply overlook Section 482 of CrPC or the other provisions that provide the entire scheme of Criminal Trials. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that the provisions of any statute have to be construed harmoniously and cannot be looked at into in complete isolation. A level of exactitude is desirable in the legal process but not at the cost of absurdity. 

Without lowering the majesty of the High Courts, I think it is high time that the ratio of Madhu Limaye (supra) is applied in its proper perspective in revision petitions and such disastrous situations wherein the right of the accused to seek discharge is completely annihilated does not ever arise. The closing remarks of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case are quite pertinent wherein it said that the High Court committed an error by “overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused.” I sincerely hope that this is the last judgment wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had to reiterate that Madhu Limaye (supra) still holds the field.