In the last week, the New Zealand government has released three documents relating to national security:


Aotearoa’s National Security Strategy: Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki


Defence Policy and Strategy Statement


Future Force Design Principles


These were preceded by a public consultation exercise, a long-term insights briefing and a foreign policy assessment


In the coming week, we expect the release of an updated threat assessment.


Since Defence Minister Andrew Little’s announcements last week, there
has been at least a dozen stories a day ranging from the importance of
New Zealand’s ‘first ever’ national security strategy, to an upcoming
major cash injection into defence and a complete sell-out to foreign
interests – notably those of the USA.


Never in the field of Kiwi conflict have so many words been written
on behalf of so many people by so few and for so little effect.


It’s not all bad. The fact that there is a document that says
“National Security Strategy” means we now have a document to debate and improve. The acknowledgement that the public must be taken into the conversation is long overdue – as long as it happens. The written
acknowledgement that greater investment in defence is required is very
significant.


I know you can hear the whistling of an incoming “BUT…”


A strategy it is not. It is what academics would call a ‘meta-policy.’ By its own admission it sits over the country’s:

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy
Cyber Security Strategy
Maritime Security Strategy
Transnational Organised Crime Strategy
Pacific Resilience Strategy
Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy
Defence Policy Statements and White Papers
National Space Policy
Border Security Strategy

A strategy is contested. Its success can be measured. This is a
policy dressed in strategy clothes. The best thing to potentially come
out of this process is the creation of a National Intelligence and
Security Agency. But that is not explicitly written only talked about.


The Defence Policy and Strategy Statement is little more than a
re-hash of earlier documents such as the 2021 Assessment which followed Ron Mark’s ‘shell game’ that produced the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Review and the 2019 Defence Capability Plan. These exercises in political pilates only stretch out acquisition times for new capabilities.


Then there are the Future Force Design Principles which “acts as a bridge between the high-level policy and strategy in the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 and detailed investment planning that will be included in a Defence Capability Plan.” – The latter document will be sometime next year. Only then will an acquisition process be initiated. When you take out the pictures and the fluff, there’s 1800 words on 5 pages wrapped around 11 principles. Three of these are ‘fixed’ and eight are ‘sliding principles.’


Simon Ewing-Jarvie and Heather Roy discuss these documents and what they mean for New Zealand's national security.