Pete Mandik is once again joined by David Pereplyotchik (see episode 25) and this time they enter into a world of pain. Are pains identical to states of brains? Are pains fully accessible only from the first-person point of view? Is there anything contradictory about the idea of unconscious pains? Can you merely seem to yourself to be suffering without actually really being in a state of suffering? Will Pete and David answer any of these questions about pain in the philosophy of mind?

Episode Notes and Links

Pete Mandik is once again joined by David Pereplyotchik (see episode 25) and this time they enter into a world of pain. Are pains identical to states of brains? Are pains fully accessible only from the first-person point of view? Is there anything contradictory about the idea of unconscious pains? Can you merely seem to yourself to be suffering without actually really being in a state of suffering? Will Pete and David answer any of these questions about pain in the philosophy of mind?

(The audio for this episode is drawn from the video chat viewable here: @YouTube.)

Links:

Jennifer CornsThe Value of Suffering ProjectPete Mandik - "Varieties of Representation in Evolved and Embodied Neural Networks"Pete Mandik, Mike Collins, and Alex Vereschagin - "Evolving Artificial Minds and Brains"Galen Strawson - "Consciousness Myth"Daniel Dennett -  “Why you can’t make a computer that feels pain” Murat Aydede and Donald Price “The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies”